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Abstract
Selten’s game is a kidnapping model where the probability of capturing the kidnapper is inde-
pendent of whether the hostage has been released or executed. Most often, in view of the elevated
sensitivities involved, authorities put greater effort and resources into capturing the kidnapper
if the hostage has been executed, in contrast to the case when a ransom is paid to secure the
hostage’s release. In this paper, we study the asymmetric game when the probability of capturing
the kidnapper depends on whether the hostage has been executed or not and find a new uniquely
determined perfect equilibrium point in Selten’s game.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although it is not a common crime, there are parts of the world where kidnapping is
a real and constant threat. In a typical scenario, a victim is abducted and a monetary
demand is made for his or her release. Although it appears to be a simple exchange of
money for the release of a hostage, dealing with the situation does require considerable
planning. This is where game theory [1–3], a developed branch of mathematics that models
strategic situations, can offer valuable insights.
In 1976, Reinhard Selten [5] developed a game-theoretic model of kidnapping as a two-
person sequential game between player K (Kidnapper) and player F (hostage’s Family). The
game begins with K’s choice whether or not to go ahead with his plan that is described by
a binary decision variable b :
b :


0
1
Not to kidnap,
To kidnap.
(1)
The game ends if K selects b = 0. If K selects b = 1, he takes the hostage to a hidden
place unknown to player F and to the police, and announces a ransom demand D.
Numerous questions then arise. Will the hostage’s family pay the ransom D or will they
try to negotiate a lower amount? If they do pay the ransom, should K free the hostage
instead of executing him/her? Moreover, if F does not expect K to free the hostage, why
should it be expected that F pay some ransom?
It is assumed that, on knowing the demand D, a negotiation process starts between
players K and F. Player F makes an offer C which is the amount willing to be paid, and
player K either decides to accept C and release the hostage, or to execute the hostage. The
situation can be seen as a simple description of an extended bargaining process.
In his model, Selten assumed that K’s threat to execute the hostage has some credibility,
even though K cannot improve his situation by doing so. In particular, it is expected that
with a positive probability α, player K may deem the offer C < D to be insufficient, and
thus decide to execute the hostage. Selten assumed that the probability α can be described
as a linear function of C
D
:
α = a
[
1−
C
D
]
for 0 ≤ C ≤ D (2)
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where a is a constant with 0 < a < 1. The parameter α thus describes K’s non-rational
decision to execute the hostage, as in this case, the traditional utility maximisation principle
is ignored.
It is nonetheless possible that Player K makes the rational decision to execute the hostage
independently of whether the offer C is deemed insufficient or not. Selten used a binary
decision variable e to describe this situation:
e :


0
1
Release of hostage for ransom C,
Execution of hostage,
(3)
i.e. even if an offer is made at C, 0 ≤ C ≤ D, the hostage can still be executed for some C.
II. MODIFIED KIDNAPPING GAME
In either case of the hostage having been executed or released, the authorities will put
efforts in finding and capturing the kidnapper K. In Selten’s model, it is assumed that, in
both cases, the authorities will be successful in capturing K with some probability q, where
0 < q < 1 (4)
i.e. the probability of capturing the kidnapper is independent of whether the hostage has
been released or executed. We ask whether this indeed is the usual case.
Cursory observations of media coverage related to kidnapping incidences highlight the
political pressure faced by authorities to severely punish those responsible, the idea being
that punishment helps decrease the incidence of such events in the future. It is however
unclear whether authorities favour the allocation of extra resources towards the capture of
those who executed the hostage or those who did not. No consensus appears to prevail, and
resource spending seems to be case dependent and government dependent, with the media
likely playing a role in the decision of whether extra resources are spent to increase the
chances of capturing the kidnapper.
Assuming that increased spending leads to a higher probability of capture, we thus adopt
two random choice parameters q0 and q1 instead of the fixed probability q assumed by Selten,
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that we define as follows:
q0 = probability of capture of K if hostage is released,
q1 = probability of capture of K if hostage is killed. (5)
This allows us to an improved modeling of the responses by authorities, and helps us eluci-
date whether allocating extra resources to increase the likelihood of capturing the kidnapper
influences the kidnapper’s strategy.
As we focus on the probability of the kidnapper’s capture, it is also important to en-
compass the idea that, in the case where the hostage is executed, families derive a higher
disutility from the kidnapper still being at large. This gives us the payoffs depicted in Table
1.
Elevated sensitivities lead to increased pressure on the police, and government, to capture
the kidnappers that usually results in an increase in the resources for finding the kidnappers.
Investing extra efforts and resources may result in an increased probability of capturing the
kidnapper.
In the following, we study the situation when the probability of capturing the kidnapper
depends on whether the hostage has been killed or not and find a new uniquely determined
perfect equilibrium point in Selten’s game.
Payoffs
Outcome Player K Player F
Kidnapping does not take place 0 0
Release of hostage for ransom payment C, Kidnapper not caught C −C
Kidnapper caught after release of hostage −X 0
Kidnapper not caught after execution of hostage −Y −W1
Kidnapper caught after execution of hostage −Z −W2
Table 1. The payoffs for players K and F.
Here W1, W2, X, Y, and Z are positive constants and utilities of K and F that are
assumed to be linear in money. In the original game presented by Selten, W1 = W2 = W ,
and q0 = q1 = q.
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As in Selten’s game, if K is caught, the execution of the hostage results in an increased
disutility relative to the case when K releases the hostage. Thus,
Z ≥ X. (6)
As the complete history of the previous game is known to both players at every point in the
course of play, the game can be identified as an extensive game with perfect information [7].
Note that Table 1 encompasses a number of simplifying assumptions. First, player K’s
cost of preparing the kidnapping is assigned zero value. Also, player F’s non-monetary
disutilities, other than those that are incurred if player K executes the hostage, are ignored.
In reality, there can be significant disutility for player F resulting from the emotional stress
of engaging in a bargaining process with player K. Also, player F is assumed to gain no
utility from the capture of K by the authorities if the hostage is released. Finally, note
that utilities when player K is caught after the release of the hostage do not depend on the
ransom money C as it is recovered and given back to player F. However, player K is then
left with disutility X . FIG. 1 shows the extensive form of the game.
A. Game timeline
Below, we provide a short description of the timeline of the game:
1. Player K chooses between b = 1 and b = 0, i.e. whether or not to kidnap someone.
2. If K selects b = 0, the game ends and both players K and F receive zero payoffs; if K
selects b = 1, K then announces demand D.
3. After observing demand D, F makes an offer C such that 0 ≤ C ≤ D.
4. After K observes the offer C, a non-rational execution of the hostage occurs with
probability α defined by Eq. (2).
5. If the hostage is not executed non-rationally, K chooses between e = 0 and e = 1. If
K selects e = 0, this means that ransom C is paid and the hostage is released. If K
selects e = 1, the hostage is (rationally) executed irrespective of whether any ransom
is paid or not.
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FIG. 1: Representation of the game in extensive form. Strategic players, i.e. those deriving payoffs
from the game, are K (Kidnapper) and F (hostage’s Family). NRK represents the nonrational
decision of player K. NRK and Police’s later actions represent random events occurring with some
probabilities. Payoffs are presented for player K first and player F second.
6. After release or execution of the hostage, two final random choice parameters q0 and
q1 reflect the likelihood for the kidnapper to be captured, where q0 is the probability
of capture if the hostage is released and q1 is the probability of capture if the hostage
is executed.
7. The game then ends with payoffs according to Table 1.
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III. EQUILIBRIUM OF THE GAME
Being one of the foundational concepts in game theory, Nash equilibrium are used to
predict the strategies used by players of noncooperative games. A strategy profile specifies a
strategy for each player and constitutes a Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to
deviate from their current strategy. Any finite game admits at least one Nash equilibrium.
The mathematical conditions defining a Nash equilibrium, called the Nash conditions, may
nonetheless lead to unreasonable outcomes, as pointed out by Selten [6, 7]. This is because
the Nash conditions do not account for the dynamics of the game (if any).
Selten thus used the notion of perfect equilibrium as a refinement on the set of Nash
equilibria to solve for the equilibrium of the Kidnapping game. A subgame perfect equilibrium
[6–9] is not only a Nash equilibrium in the whole game, it is also a Nash equilibrium is every
subgame. For finite games with perfect information, such as the one considered in this paper,
subgame perfect equilibrium are commonly determined using backward induction [1, 2].
In what follows, we follow Selten’s original work, and identify the equilibrium of the game
using the concept of subgame perfection [2, 4, 10].
A. Optimal choice of e
We start by examining the subgame that begins with player K’s choice of e. Let V0 be
K’s expected payoff if K selects e = 0 and let V1 be the expected payoff if K selects e = 1
(i.e. the execution of the hostage). We have:
V0 = (1− q0)C − q0X, and. (7)
V1 = −(1− q1)Y − q1Z. (8)
Note that the case
q0 = q1 = q (9)
was considered by Selten.
In that case, as C ≥ 0, Y > 0, Z ≥ X and 0 < q < 1 we have
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V0 > V1 (10)
and e = 0 becomes the optimal choice for player K. That is, for the case studied by Selten,
player K will never rationally decide to execute the hostage. This could give the impression
that when (9) does not hold, release of the hostage (e = 0) would not remain the optimal
choice of e. If the values of q0 and q1 rely on heightened sensitivities, i.e. authorities allocate
more resources when the hostage has been executed so as to increase the likelihood of
capturing K, we can assume that q1 > q0. In this case, e = 0 remains the optimal choice for
K, as in Selten’s original work. This is because (1 − q0)C > 0, while −(1 − q1)Y < 0, and
thus disutilities are ranked such that q0X < q1Z (as X ≤ Z), which gives us that V0 > V1.
However, if q0 > q1, release of the hostage (e = 0) may not remain the optimal choice for
K, which is in contrast with Selten’s work.
B. Optimal choice of C
In the subgame that begins with player F’s choice of C, player F knows that player K
can execute the hostage with probability α given in Eq. (2). Using Table 1, the expected
value of F’s utility is thus equal to:
U = (1− α) [(1− q0)(−C) + q0(0)] + α [(1− q1)(−W1) + q1(−W2)] . (11)
With the constraints
W1 = W2 = W and q0 = q1 = q, (12)
Eq. (11) is reduced to
U = −(1− α)(1− q)C − αW, (13)
which is player F’s expected value of utility for the case that Selten considered. From FIG.
1 we note that (1 − α) is the probability of the hostage being released because of K’s non-
rational decision. However, e = 0 is K’s rational decision to release the hostage and thus
(1− α) is not the probability of e = 0.
Using the expression for α from Eq. (2) in Eq. (11), we have:
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U = [−a(1− q0)]
C2
D
+ [(1− q1)W1 + q1W2]
aC
D
−
(1− a)(1− q0)C − [(1− q1)W1 + q1W2] a. (14)
Once again, under the constraints described by (12) Eq. (14) reduces to
U = −a(1− q)
C2
D
+
[
aW
D
− (1− a)(1− q)
]
C − aW, (15)
which is a strictly concave quadratic function as obtained by Selten [5]. In order to determine
the optimal value C¯ of C we compute ∂U
∂C
from Eq. (14)
∂U
∂C
= [−a(1− q0)]
2C
D
+ [(1− q1)W1 + q1W2]
a
D
− (1− a)(1− q0). (16)
Eq. (16) shows that U assumes its maximum at
C ′ =
(1− q1)W1 + q1W2
2(1− q0)
−
(1− a)D
2a
, (17)
if the value of C is in the interval 0 ≤ C ≤ D. This is the case if D is in the closed interval
between the following critical values
D′1 =
a
(1 + a)
.
(1− q1)W1 + q1W2
(1− q0)
, (18)
D′2 =
a
(1− a)
.
(1− q1)W1 + q1W2
(1− q0)
. (19)
As before, under the constraints (12) Eqs. (18, 19) become
D1 =
a
(1 + a)
.
W
(1− q)
, (20)
D2 =
a
(1− a)
.
W
(1− q)
, (21)
as obtained by Selten. To determine the range for which U is an increasing function i.e.
∂U
∂C
> 0, (22)
we use Eqs. (16, 18) to write inequality (22) as
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[(1 + a)D′1 − (1− a)D] > 2aC, (23)
i.e. the function U, as described by Eq. (14), is an increasing function for D′1 > D. Likewise,
considering the inequality
∂U
∂C
< 0, (24)
we use Eqs. (16, 19) to write inequality (24) as
(D′2 −D)(1− a) < 2aC, (25)
i.e. the function U, as described by Eq. (14), is a decreasing function for D′2 < D.
In view of Eq. (17) describing the maximum that the function U assumes, player F’s
optimal offer C¯ ′ can be described as follows
C¯ ′ =


D
(1−q1)W1+q1W2
2(1−q0)
−
(1−a)D
2a
0
for 0 < D ≤ D′1,
for D′1 < D ≤ D
′
2,
for D > D′2.
(26)
As D increases, the optimal offer C¯ ′ first increases up to D′1 and then decreases until it
becomes 0 at D = D′2. In the interval D
′
1 < D ≤ D
′
2 the optimal offer C¯
′ is decreased by an
increase of D. The threat of execution of the hostage is avoided in the intervals 0 < D ≤ D′1,
as player F agrees to meeting the demand for the ransom.
Note that under constraints (12), the optimal offer C¯ ′ is reduced to C¯
C¯ =


D
W
2(1−q)
−
(1−a)D
2a
0
for 0 < D ≤ D1,
for D1 < D ≤ D2,
for D > D2
(27)
where D1 and D2 are given in Eqs. (20, 21), as obtained by Selten. FIG. 2 plots the optimal
offer against the demand D when the probability of capturing the kidnapper depends on
whether the hostage has been executed or not (dotted line) and in the case studied by
Selten (solid line). Note that, with reference to Eqs. (20, 21, 18, 19), the figure assumes that
D2 > D1 and D
′
2 > D
′
1, but generally D
′
1 −D1 6= D
′
2 −D2 and D2 −D1 6= D
′
2 −D1.
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FIG. 2: Optimal offer againts the demand when the probability of capturing the kidnapper depends
on whether the hostage has been executed or not (dotted line) and in the case studied by Selten
(solid line). The scales along the optimal offer and demand axes are different.
C. Optimal Choice of D
We now consider the subgame that begins with player K’s choice of D, the amount
requested for the ransom. The optimal offer is given by Eq. (26). Let α¯ and V¯0 be the
values that α and V0 assume at C = C¯, respectively. Then, the optimal probability of the
non-rational execution of the hostage as a function of demand D becomes:
α¯′ = a(1−
C¯ ′
D
). (28)
Using Eq. (7), we have:
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V¯0 = (1− q0)C¯
′ − q0X.
Therefore, player K’s expected payoff becomes:
V = (1− α¯′)V¯0 + α¯
′V1, (29)
where
V¯0 = (1− q0)C¯
′ − q0X. (30)
and V1 is given by Eq. (8). Therefore:
V = a(1−
C¯ ′
D
)(V1 − V¯0) + V¯0. (31)
Using Eq. (26), V becomes:
V =


V¯0
a
[
1− (1−q1)W1+q1W2
2(1−q0)D
+ (1−a)
2a
]
(V1 − V¯0) + V¯0
a(V1 − V¯0) + V¯0
for 0 < D ≤ D′1,
for D′1 < D ≤ D
′
2,
for D > D′2
(32)
which can also be re-written as:
V =


(1− q0)D − q0X
1
2
[
(1 + a)− a[(1−q1)W1+q1W2]
(1−q0)D
]
V1 +
[
(1−a)
2
+ a[(1−q1)W1+q1W2]
(1−q0)D
]
V¯0
a [(1− q1)(−Y ) + q1(−Z)] + (1− a)(−q0X)
for 0 < D ≤ D′1,
for D′1 < D ≤ D
′
2,
for D > D′2.
(33)
Consider first D′1 < D ≤ D
′
2. From Eq. (33), note that V is a decreasing function
of D if V¯0 is a constant. But V¯0 = (1 − q0)C¯
′ − q0X and for D
′
1 < D ≤ D
′
2 we have
C¯ ′ = (1−q1)W1+q1W2
2(1−q0)
−
(1−a)D
2a
. An increase of D decreases C¯ ′ and thus V¯0 is decreased too.
That is, V will be decreased further (relative to the case when V¯0 is assumed constant) when
D increases within the interval D′1 < D ≤ D
′
2. So that V as a function of D first increases
12
for values of D up to D′1. It then decreases for values of D up to D
′
2 and then remains
constant. Recall that D′1 and D
′
2 are given in Eqs. (18, 19).
Note that under the constraints (12), Eq. (33) is reduced to
V =


(1− q)D − qX
1
2
[
(1 + a)− aW
(1−q)D
]
V1 +
[
(1−a)
2
+ aW
(1−q)D
]
V¯0
a [(1− q)(−Y ) + q(−Z)] + (1− a)(−qX)
for 0 < D ≤ D1,
for D1 < D ≤ D2,
for D > D2,
(34)
as discussed by Selten, which is an increasing function for 0 < D ≤ D′1. For D
′
1 < D ≤ D
′
2
in (34), as is the case for the function (33), if V¯0 is a constant then V is a decreasing function
of D. But now V¯0 = (1− q)C¯− qX as C¯
′ reduce to C¯, given by (27), under constraints (12).
An increase of D decreases C¯ and thus V¯0 is decreased too. That is, V will be decreased
further (relative to the case when V¯0 is assumed constant) when D increases within the
interval D′1 < D ≤ D
′
2.
Player K’s optimal demand D¯′ can be considered as the highest demand D′1 such that
player F’s optimal offer C¯ ′ coincides with the demand. To determine D¯′ we refer to Eq. (26)
and set
C¯ ′ = D¯′ and D = D¯′, (35)
to have
D¯′ =
(1− q1)W1 + q1W2
2(1− q0)
−
(1− a)D¯′
2a
, (36)
which gives
D¯′ =
a
(1 + a)
.
(1− q1)W1 + q1W2
(1− q0)
. (37)
Eq. (37), under the constraints (12), then gives the player K’s optimal demand D¯ as
D¯ =
a
(1 + a)
.
W
(1− q)
, (38)
as obtained by Selten. Eq. (38) shows that a higher value of q results in an increase in D¯.
This also shifts D1 and D2, given by Eqs. (20, 21), to higher values.
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Thus, if the allocation of more resources to K’s capture is linked to an increase in q then
this also results in an increase in the optimal demand D¯. Increasing q by allocating higher
resources to police, however, is not an effective policy as it appears to be. This is because
with K’s increased probability of capture F’s chances to get the ransom money back are also
increased. This results in an increase in F’s willingness to pay and thus to a higher optimal
demand.
In our model, if the probability of capture q1 is increased, it also results in an increase in
the optimal demand D¯. However, since this increase only concerns q1, the likelihood of K to
be captured once he executes the hostage, does not have the perverted effect of increasing
F’s willingness to pay.
D. Optimal choice of b
The binary decision variable b in (1) describes player K’s choice whether or not to go
ahead with the plan to kidnap. The game ends if K selects b = 0 and the hostage is
kidnapped if K selects b = 1. Considering the subgame which begins with player K’s choice
of D, the player K’s payoff expectation V is given by Eq. (33). As noted above, V as a
function of D is first increasing up to D′1 and then decreasing up to D
′
2 and then remaining
constant. The optimal value D¯′ of D is given by Eq. (37). As noted before Eq. (35), D¯′
is the highest demand D′1 such that player F’s optimal offer C¯
′ coincides with the demand.
Let V¯ ′ be the value of V assumed at D¯′. From Eq. (33) we have
V = (1− q0)D − q0X for 0 < D ≤ D
′
1, (39)
then
V¯ ′ = (1− q0)D¯
′ − q0X, (40)
and using Eq. (37) this can be written as
V¯ ′ =
a [(1− q1)W1 + q1W2]
(1 + a)
− q0X, (41)
which at q1 = q0 = q becomes V¯ =
a
(1+a)
W − qX . In Selten’s original work, this shows that
if the probability of capture q can be increased by allocating additional resources to the
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efforts in finding K then the possibility of decreasing V¯ is only limited by the availability of
the resources. In our model, the increase of either probabilities, q1 or q0, leads to an overall
decrease in K’s utility, and the effect very much depends on the relative values of X , W1 and
W2. In particular, an increase in q1 results in the optimal choice of b likely to be b = 0, as
the value identified in Eq. (43) decreases [keeping q0 constant], and thus the first condition
is more likely to be satisfied. Similarly, if q0 increases (keeping q1 constant) then the first
condition, i.e. b = 0 is more likely to hold. If ∆W = W1 −W2 is sufficiently large however
then increasing q1 appears to be more optimal in discouraging to select b = 1.
Now the optimal choice of b¯ is obtained by the following requirements
b¯′ = 0 for V¯ ′ < 0,
b¯′ = 1 for V¯ ′ > 0, (42)
which can be written as
b¯′ :


0
1
for a[(1−q1)W1+q1W2]
(1+a)
< q0X,
for a[(1−q1)W1+q1W2]
(1+a)
> q0X,
(43)
and when W1 =W2 = W , and q0 = q1 = q, it is reduced to
b¯ :


0
1
for aW
(1+a)
< qX,
for aW
(1+a)
> qX,
(44)
as obtained by Selten. Player K’s choice whether or not to go ahead with the plan to kidnap
now depends on W1, W2, q0, and q1.
IV. DISCUSSION
The dependence of K’s probability of being captured on whether he has executed the
hostage or not can be represented as a bifurcation of q (probability of K’s capture in either
case of hostage to have been executed or not) into q1 (probability of K’s capture when the
hostage has been executed) and q0 (probability of K’s capture when the hostage has been
released after paying the ransom).
Overall, we show that increasing either q0 or q1 leads to a reduced likelihood of kidnapping,
provided that q1 > q0 (otherwise e=0 is not necessarily the optimal choice of K). We also
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show that if the kidnapping took place, releasing the hostage and paying the ransom remains
the optimal choice for K provided the motivation in assigning values to q0 and q1 takes into
account the heightened sensitivities, i.e. authorities spend more resources when the hostage
has been executed so as to increase the likelihood of capturing player K (i.e. q1 > q0).
Therefore, increasing q1 not only lessen the likelihood of kidnapping, it also ensures that q1
stays above q0 and presents the added benefit of lowering the ransom D. This means that
increasing q1 appears to be more optimal than increasing q0.
A question that might arise is whether it is in the interest of police to advertise the
increase in resources, or whether F and K even know about it. From FIG.1, K’s rational
decision (dictated by e = 1 or e = 0) to execute or release the hostage respectively, is known
to F. Even if the police remain discreet and do not announce that they are investing more
(or less or same) resources in case where e = 1, the events e = 1 or e = 0 themselves
appear sufficient to result in the bifurcation of q into to q0 and q1. Furthermore, studying
this bifurcation allows us to understand better the consequences emanating from increasing
either q1 or q0. As we have seen earlier, increasing q1 may result in overall better outcomes.
The non-rational execution of the hostage is a characteristic of Selten’s model that can be
explained using a Bayesian approach, i.e. by considering the belief K has about F’s ability
to pay. If K thinks that F can pay but F decides not to, this can result in K reacting in a
non-rational way, as proposed by Selten. It is anticipated that by introducing beliefs for K,
regarding whether or not F can match his demand, it can lend a further perspective to the
analysis of this game. In particular, this would result in considering a Bayesian equilibrium
instead of subgame perfect equilibrium.
Selten used a binary decision variable e in Eq. (3) in order to describe the situation
that K can execute the hostage while enacting a non-rational decision. As the hostage may
be executed even when the ransom demand is met, therefore, α 6= 0 even if C = D. An
appropriate probability function to describe the non-rational situation could be when
α = a
[
1−
C
D
+ β
]
for 0 ≤ C ≤ D and β > 0. (45)
A policy objective is to minimize the optimal demand as given in Eq. (37). Given fixed
resources can be allocated to police to increase the chances of capturing K, these resources
are better spent towards increasing q1.
If K is aware that F cannot meet his demand, then K could either lower his demand
16
and/or decide whether to execute the hostage on rational grounds. This rational decision
to execute the hostage depends on probabilities q1 and q0, and we know that as long as
as q1 > q0, executing the hostage is not optimal for K. Thus increasing q1, as opposed to
allocate resources to q0 is again more desirable.
The other situation that could be incorporated in the model is when player K’s cost of
preparing the kidnapping is considered non-negligible and player F’s non-monetary disutil-
ities, other than those incurred by the hostage’s life, are however considered negligible. For
instance, player F does not attach any value to the capture of the kidnapper.
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